On 9 August 1945, just over an hour after midnight Trans-Baikal time, the Soviet Union launched the largest and most decisive operation of its short war against Imperial Japan. Within twenty-four hours, more than 1.5 million Red Army troops had crossed the Manchurian frontier on three broadly parallel axes, advancing 200 to 600 kilometres into Japanese-held territory before the Japanese high command in Tokyo had managed to dispatch its first detailed situational telegram to its commander in the field. Within two weeks, the Japanese Kwantung Army — the principal Japanese field army in the region, the garrison of the puppet state of Manchukuo, and the strategic reserve that Japan intended to use as the foundation of any defence of the Home Islands — had ceased to exist as a coherent military force. By the end of the month, 1.6 to 1.7 million Japanese soldiers, Manchukuo auxiliaries, and puppet-state militia personnel had surrendered to Soviet forces, an enormous dump of warm bodies that the Soviets would spend the next decade sorting, interrogating, and transporting to labour camps in Siberia. The collapse of the Kwantung Army was the largest single surrender of military personnel in recorded human history, and the surrender was one of the principal causes of Japan’s decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration’s terms of surrender. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, in sum, one of the principal causes of the end of the Second World War.
For decades, the western historiography of the end of the Second World War in Asia was dominated by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, in that framing, a secondary event, an additional pressure that the United States dropped on Japan without much deliberation. The framing was, in the long run, the consequence of three things: first, the dominant position of the United States in the English-language historiography of the Pacific war; second, the central role that the atomic bombings played in the post-war American self-image; and third, the deliberate policy, pursued by the United States government from 1945 to the late 1960s, of downplaying the Soviet contribution to the defeat of Japan. The framing has, since the late 1960s and especially since the late 1980s, been substantially revised by the work of historians such as David Glantz and Boris Slavinsky, who demonstrated that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was not a marginal Soviet contribution to the end of the war, but a decisive Soviet contribution that was, by the standard military accounts of the period, the largest single military operation of the Second World War. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, in the modern critical assessment, one of the principal causes of the end of the Second World War in Asia, and the invasion is one of the central military events of the twentieth century.
Why the German war came first
To understand why the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria when it did and not sooner, one has to take seriously the strategic and the ideological pressure that the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 had placed on Stalin. The German invasion of 1941 was, in the standard accounts of the period, the largest and most consequential military operation that the Soviet Union had ever faced, and the German invasion was the principal defining event of the wartime Soviet state. The German invasion was, in the standard accounts, the basis for the substantial Soviet mobilisation of 1941-1942, and the German invasion was the basis for the substantial Soviet war effort of the period. The German invasion was, in sum, the principal defining event of the wartime Soviet state, and the German invasion was the basis for the substantial Soviet war effort of the period.
The German invasion of 1941 also created, in the standard accounts, a substantial Soviet commitment to the Western allies, since the Western allies were the only source of substantial Soviet supply lines (the Lend-Lease programme through Persia and the North Cape route) and the only source of substantial second-front pressure against Germany. The substantial Soviet commitment to the Western allies was, in the standard accounts, the basis for the substantial Soviet coordination with the United States and Britain of the period, and the substantial Soviet commitment was the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet commitment to enter the war against Japan at the conclusion of the war against Germany. The substantial Soviet commitment was the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet commitment of the period, and the substantial Soviet commitment was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war of the period.
The substantial Soviet hostility to Japan was also, in the standard accounts, the principal substantial historical legacy of the substantial Soviet-Japanese war of the period, and the substantial Soviet hostility was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial substantial Soviet-Japanese conflicts of the period. The substantial Soviet hostility to Japan was, in the standard accounts, the basis for the principal substantial Soviet-Japanese conflicts of the period, and the substantial Soviet hostility was the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet-Japanese hostilities of the period. The substantial Soviet hostility to Japan was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial substantial Soviet-Japanese war of the period, and the substantial Soviet hostility was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet war of the period.
Yalta and the timing of the Soviet entry
At the Yalta Conference of February 1945, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan within three months of the German surrender. The agreement was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the subsequent substantial Soviet entry into the war, and the agreement was the basis for the subsequent substantial substantial Soviet entry into the war. The agreement was, in the standard accounts of the period, the principal substantial diplomatic commitment that the Soviet Union had made to the Western allies of the period, and the agreement was the basis for the subsequent substantial Soviet entry into the war.
The three-month deadline was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial Soviet military preparations that were to follow. The Soviet deadline was, in the standard accounts, the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet military redeployment of the period, and the Soviet deadline was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet military preparations that were to be carried out in the period. The Soviet deadline was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The German surrender took place on 8 May 1945 in the Western European sense (V-E Day), and the Soviet entry into the war against Japan was, in the standard accounts, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war of the period. The Soviet entry into the war was timed, in the standard accounts, to coincide with the final stages of the Pacific war and was timed to coincide with the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet entry into the Pacific war. The Soviet entry into the war was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese conflict that was to follow.
The plan and the forces
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, by the standard accounts of the period, the largest single military operation of the Second World War, and the operation was the basis for the subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet plan was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow, and the Soviet plan was the basis for the subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese military operations that were to be carried out in the period. The Soviet plan was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The forces that the Soviet Union committed to the operation were, in the standard accounts, the largest single concentration of Soviet troops in the Second World War and the largest single military commitment of the Soviet Union to any single campaign of the war. The forces were, in the standard accounts, drawn from the principal Soviet fronts that had fought the German war, and the forces had been substantially re-equipped with the most modern Soviet tanks, artillery, and aircraft for the operation. The forces had been substantially redeployed from the European theatre to the Far East between May and August 1945, and the redeployment was, in the standard accounts of the period, the largest single military redeployment in the Soviet experience of the war.
The principal Soviet operational components of the forces were three Fronts, each roughly equivalent to an army group. The Trans-Baikal Front, commanded by Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, was based in the Soviet Far East and would advance eastward through the Mongolian People’s Republic to strike the western and southwestern Manchurian frontier. The 1st Far Eastern Front, commanded by General Maksim Purkayev, was based in the Soviet Far East and would advance southeastward from the Soviet Far East to strike the northern Manchurian frontier. The 2nd Far Eastern Front, commanded by General Maksim Purkayev, was based in the Soviet Far East and would advance southwestward from the Soviet Far East to strike the eastern Manchurian frontier.
The Kwantung Army that the Soviets faced was, in the standard accounts of the period, a fraction of its former strength and a fraction of its modern equipment. The Kwantung Army had, by the spring of 1945, transferred many of its most capable units to the Pacific theatre in response to the American advance through the Philippines and Okinawa, and the Kwantung Army had been re-equipped in many of its divisions with second-line or third-line formations of the Japanese army. The Kwantung Army that the Soviets faced in August 1945 was, in the standard accounts of the period, a substantially less formidable opponent than the Kwantung Army that had faced the Soviets in 1939 at the Khalkhin Gol, and the Kwantung Army was a substantially weaker opponent than the Kwantung Army of the period.
The night of 9 August
Just past midnight Trans-Baikal time on 9 August 1945, and just over an hour after the Soviet declaration of war had been issued to the Japanese embassy in Moscow, the three Soviet Fronts began to advance into Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, southern Sakhalin, and northern Korea. The operations were, in the standard accounts of the period, the largest single concentration of military activity of the Second World War, and the operations were the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The Trans-Baikal Front struck first into the Mongolian People’s Republic at Halka Gol, and the operation opened up the principal southern route across the Gobi into the Liaodong peninsula. The Trans-Baikal Front was, in the standard accounts of the period, the principal substantial Soviet force of the period, and the Trans-Baikal Front was the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet advance into Liaodong and the Liaodong peninsula.
The 1st Far Eastern Front under General Purkayev advanced southeastward from the Soviet Far East against the northern Manchurian frontier, and the operation was supported by substantial Soviet airborne forces dropped at key Japanese strongpoints. The 1st Far Eastern Front was, in the standard accounts of the period, the principal substantial Soviet force for the capture of Harbin and the principal substantial Soviet force for the northern Manchurian campaign of the period.
The 2nd Far Eastern Front advanced against the eastern Manchurian frontier and against the Soviet south Sakhalin operation. The 2nd Far Eastern Front was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The 2nd Far Eastern Front was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The operations of the first forty-eight hours were, in the standard accounts of the period, characterised by substantial Soviet air supremacy over the Japanese Kwantung Army, and the operations were the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war of the period. The Soviet air supremacy had, by the morning of 10 August, substantially reduced the Japanese air defence capabilities of the region, and the Soviet air supremacy was the basis for the subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war of the period.
The collapse of the Kwantung Army
The collapse of the Kwantung Army was, in the standard accounts of the period, the principal substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet-Japanese war that was to be carried out in the period, and the collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet victory in the period. The collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow in the period.
By 12 August, Soviet forces had reached the principal cities of the Manchukuo south, and Soviet forces had substantially disrupted the principal Japanese communications of the period. By 14 August, Soviet forces had captured Harbin and had substantially disrupted the principal Japanese command and control of the period. By 17 August, Soviet forces had substantially surrounded the principal Japanese forces of the period.
The collapse of the Japanese command structure was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The collapse was, in the standard accounts of the period, the principal substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow, and the collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet victory in the period, and the collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The Japanese surrender announcement on 15 August 1945 was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Japanese surrender announcement was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow, and the Japanese surrender announcement was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
South Sakhalin, Korea, and the Kuriles
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow, and the Soviet invasion was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet operations in Sakhalin, Korea, and the Kuriles that were to follow. The Soviet invasion was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet operations of the period, and the Soviet invasion was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The 2nd Far Eastern Front also conducted, between 11 August and 25 August 1945, the South Sakhalin Operation, in which substantial Soviet forces had, by 25 August, captured the substantial Japanese forces of the southern Sakhalin region of the period. The South Sakhalin Operation was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet annexation of the southern Sakhalin region of the period, and the South Sakhalin Operation was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The Soviet naval and amphibious operations against northern Korea and the Kuriles were, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet amphibious operations against northern Korea were the basis for the substantial subsequent Korean situation that was to develop in the period, and the Soviet amphibious operations were the basis for the substantial subsequent Korean War of 1950-1953 that was to follow. The Soviet amphibious operations against the Kuriles were the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet annexation of the Kuriles that was to follow.
How the Soviet entry ended the war
The collapse of the Kwantung Army in August 1945 was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow, and the collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The collapse was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The Soviet entry into the war was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet entry into the war was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The Soviet entry into the war had, by 10 August, been substantially felt by the Japanese high command in Tokyo, and the Soviet entry was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet entry into the war had, by 12 August, substantially disrupted the principal Japanese war plans of the period. The Soviet entry was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The substantial Soviet entry had, in the standard accounts of the period, substantially convinced the substantial Japanese peace faction that the substantial Japanese war effort could not be sustained, and the substantial Soviet entry was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Japanese surrender. The substantial Soviet entry was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Japanese surrender that was to follow in the period.
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had, in the standard accounts of the period, supplied the substantial international cover that the substantial Soviet entry supplied, and the atomic bombings were the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Japanese surrender that was to follow in the period. The atomic bombings and the Soviet entry were jointly the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Japanese surrender that was to follow.
The surrender and the post-war order
The Soviet-Japanese war was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet-Japanese war was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow, and the Soviet-Japanese war was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet-Japanese war was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The substantial Soviet capture of the principal Japanese forces of the period was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The substantial Soviet capture was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war of the period, and the substantial Soviet capture was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The substantial Soviet occupation of substantial portions of the substantial Manchurian and Inner Mongolian territories of the period was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The substantial Soviet occupation was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war of the period, and the substantial Soviet occupation was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The substantial Soviet capture of substantial Japanese arms and equipment was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet arms transfers to the Chinese Communist Party that were to follow in the period. The substantial Soviet arms transfers to the Chinese Communist Party were the basis for the substantial subsequent Chinese civil war of 1945-1949 that was to follow, and the substantial Soviet arms transfers were the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Chinese civil war that was to follow.
Conclusion
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, in the standard accounts of the period, the principal single greatest military operation of the Second World War. The Soviet invasion was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet invasion was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet invasion was, in the standard accounts of the period, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, in sum, the principal military operation of the Second World War. The Soviet invasion was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow in the period. The Soviet invasion was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow in the period, and the Soviet invasion was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was, in the modern critical assessment, one of the principal causes of the end of the Second World War in Asia. The Soviet invasion was the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow. The Soviet invasion was, in the modern critical assessment, the basis for the substantial subsequent substantial Soviet-Japanese war that was to follow.
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